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Abstract  Evidence  about  the  relation  between  earnings  management  and  voluntary  audits  is
scarce, and  there  is  no  research  about  the  effectiveness  of  mandatory  audits  to  improve  earn-
ings quality.  Using  a  sample  of  Spanish  SMEs,  where  some  companies  are  mandatorily  audited
and some  are  exempt  from  audit,  we  examine  if  audits,  either  mandatory  or  voluntary,  help
to improve  accounting  quality  by  constraining  earnings  management.  We  also  examine  differ-
ences between  voluntary  and  mandatory  audits,  as  well  as  the  role  of  Big  4  and  Middle-Tier
auditors. After  controlling  for  other  characteristics  that  affect  earnings  management,  we  ﬁnd
that audited  companies  have  lower  absolute  discretionary  accruals,  but  do  not  ﬁnd  signiﬁ-
cant differences  among  auditors.  Voluntary  audits  also  restrain  earnings  management,  but  in
a lesser  extent  than  mandatory  audits.  When  we  use  signed  accruals,  audits  are  only  effective
against income-increasing  behaviours,  what  is  explained  by  the  auditor  conservatism.  AdditionalSpain analyses support  the  results  obtained.
© 2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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iterature  about  earnings  management  and  accounting  qual-
ty  is  extensive  (García  Osma  et  al.,  2005;  Dechow  et  al.,
010).  A  stream  of  research  that  has  been  deeply  studied
s  the  relationship  between  auditing  and  earnings  man-
gement,  because  it  is  expected  that  audits  work  as  a
onstraint  to  managerial  discretion  in  reporting  earnings
nd  help  to  improve  the  reliability  and  the  quality  of  the
nancial  information.  The  papers  that  have  studied  this
elationship  have  focused  on  the  differential  value  among
uditors  to  deter  earnings  management  activities,  depend-
ng  on  speciﬁc  dimensions  of  auditors.  However,  there  is  a
ack  of  empirical  research  in  two  issues:  (i)  whether  audits,
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
1r
s
a
a
a
B
2
d
i
c
i
l
t
S
a
d
2
b
i
(
t
t
i
i
b
a
a
a
a
t
a
a
e
t
i
h
q
t
h
o
a
o
r
a
t
a
p
c
M
t
p
2
i
i
G
m
b
i
a
M
f
S
e
a
t
i
c
ﬁ
c
t
m
F
t
2
i
t
a
m
c
b
v
a
4
t
a
ﬁ
t
2
a
v
a
t
e
t
i
t
a
n
v
m
m
s
M
o
a
w
a
a
c
e
c
k72  
egardless  of  the  characteristics  of  the  auditor,  actually  con-
train  earnings  management  and  improve  earnings  quality;
nd  (ii)  whether  there  are  differences  between  voluntary
nd  mandatory  audits.
First,  papers  commonly  examine  the  differences  between
uditors  with  different  characteristics  (Becker  et  al.,  1998;
alsam  et  al.,  2003;  Chung  et  al.,  2005;  Carey  and  Simnett,
006;  Cano,  2007;  Basioudis  et  al.,  2008).  However,  they
o  not  study  if  audits,  regardless  the  auditors’  character-
stics,  have  a  differential  value  compared  to  the  non-audit
ase.  The  fact  that  most  of  the  literature  examines  sett-
ngs  where  audits  are  mandatory,  such  as  large  private  or
isted  companies,  involves  that  these  papers  cannot  value
he  differences  between  unaudited  and  audited  companies.
econdly,  the  few  papers  that  study  audits  per  se  gener-
lly  show  that  audited  companies  have  a  lower  cost  of
ebt  than  the  unaudited  ones  (Kim  et  al.,  2011;  Minnis,
011),  so  audited  ﬁnancial  statements  are  perceived  to
e  more  reliable  and  thus  seem  to  provide  higher  qual-
ty  information.  However,  with  the  exceptions  of  Minnis
2011),  Ojala  et  al.  (2011)  and  Dedman  and  Kausar  (2012),
here  is  a  lack  of  empirical  evidence  examining  whether
he  audited  companies  actually  provide  higher  quality
nformation.
Minnis  (2011)  and  Dedman  and  Kausar  (2012)  exam-
ne  the  effects  of  voluntary  audits  on  accounting  quality,
ut  there  is  no  research  about  the  effects  of  mandatory
udits.  This  is  important  because  accounting  quality  can  be
ffected  in  a  different  way  depending  on  whether  audits
re  voluntary  or  mandatory.  On  the  one  hand,  voluntarily
udited  companies  may  be  willing  to  send  a  signal  about
he  quality  of  the  accounting  information,  and  Minnis  (2011)
nd  Dedman  and  Kausar  (2012)  show  that  audits  improve
ccounting  quality.  However,  we  can  expect  a  ‘‘label’’
ffect  for  the  voluntary  audit,  i.e.  companies  only  choose
o  be  audited  to  increase  their  perceived  accounting  qual-
ty  (Daske  et  al.,  2013;  Koren  et  al.,  2014).  On  the  other
and,  mandatory  audits  are  assumed  to  ensure  a  minimum
uality  of  the  ﬁnancial  information  (Ruiz  and  Gómez,  2008),
hus  companies  that  shun  the  audit  requirement  would
ave  lower  accounting  quality.  If  these  differences  are  not
bserved,  mandatory  audits  would  fail  to  achieve  their  basic
im.
SMEs  are  a  natural  setting  to  test  the  effect  of  audits
n  accounting  quality.  First  at  all,  it  is  worth  noting  their
elevance  in  the  economy  in  both  the  EU  and  the  US  (Allee
nd  Yohn,  2009;  Wymenga  et  al.,  2012).  In  Spain,  this  impor-
ance  is  even  higher  (EC,  2012).  Secondly,  the  SMEs  setting
llows  us  compare  audited  and  unaudited  ﬁrms,  a  com-
arison  that  is  not  possible  among  public  and  big  private
ompanies  because  all  of  them  are  mandatorily  audited.
oreover,  although  there  are  papers  that  analyze  the  rela-
ion  between  audit  quality  and  earnings  management  in  the
rivate  setting  (Cano,  2007;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,
008),  the  value  of  audits  for  the  smaller  of  them,  however,
s  not  as  obvious,  because  their  stakeholders  may  rely  more
n  alternative  information  sources  (Berger  and  Udell,  2006;
ill  de  Albornoz  and  Illueca,  2007),  so  the  role  of  auditors
ay  be  partially  different.
The  Spanish  case  may  shed  light  to  this  limited  value,
ecause  of  the  lower  tradition  in  the  use  of  account-
ng  information  compared  to  common-law  countries  with
a
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 longer  history  of  auditing,  such  as  the  UK  and  the  USA.
oreover,  similar  to  most  EU  countries,  Spain  requires  audits
or  companies  that  exceed  a certain  size.  The  Spanish
tatutory  Audit  Thresholds  (SAT)  are  lower  than  those  gen-
rally  applied  in  the  EU,  so  we  can  test  if  audits  have
 different  effect  depending  on  their  character  (volun-
ary  or  mandatory)  in  a  relatively  homogeneous  sample,
.e.  in  a  sample  that  only  includes  small  and  medium
ompanies.
Furthermore,  because  of  the  more  limited  usefulness  of
nancial  information  for  SMEs,  mandatory  audits  are  often
onsidered  a  potential  source  of  administrative  burdens,  so
he  EC  is  considering  the  possibility  of  revising  the  require-
ent  for  mandatory  audits  for  these  companies  (EC,  2010).
inally,  the  audit  market  for  SMEs  also  gives  us  the  oppor-
unity  to  test  the  role  of  Middle-Tier  auditors  (Boone  et  al.,
010;  Sundgren  and  Svanström,  2013).
Therefore,  using  a  sample  of  Spanish  SMEs,  we  examine
f  audits  are  a  deterrent  to  earnings  management,  measured
hrough  the  signed  and  absolute  values  of  discretionary
ccruals,  and  test  whether  this  effect  is  driven  by  a  real  com-
itment  with  accounting  quality  among  voluntarily  audited
ompanies,  or  with  a  minimum  accounting  quality  ensured
y  mandatory  audits.  We  also  test  differences  between
oluntary  and  mandatory  audits.  Moreover,  we  examine  if
udit  quality,  proxied  by  a  three-level  classiﬁcation  (Big
,  Middle-Tier  and  small  auditors),  means  differences  on
he  level  of  earnings  management.  Since  papers  about
udit  choice  have  serious  endogeneity  problems,  we  use  a
xed-effects  approach  instead  of  OLS  estimations  to  par-
ially  mitigate  them  (Kim  et  al.,  2011;  Lennox  et  al.,
012)
We  ﬁnd  that  audited  companies  have  a  lower  level  of
bsolute  discretionary  accruals  than  the  non-audited  ones;
oluntary  audits  also  restrain  earnings  management,  but  in
 lesser  extent  than  mandatory  audits.  These  results  suggest
hat  although  both  mandatory  and  voluntary  audits  improve
arnings  quality  by  restricting  the  magnitude  of  accruals,
he  lower  visibility  and  litigation  risks  faced  by  auditors
n  the  voluntary  setting  encourage  them  to  be  less  restric-
ive.  When  we  examine  separately  the  signed  discretionary
ccruals,  we  do  not  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  effect  of  audits  on
egative  accruals,  what  may  be  due  to  the  auditor  conser-
atism,  for  which  auditors  are  not  effective  against  earnings
anagement  behaviours  when  companies  have  incentives  to
anage  downward.  On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  ﬁnd  that
igniﬁcant  differences  for  companies  audited  by  Big  4  and
iddle-Tier  auditors.  Additional  analyses  support  the  results
btained.
The  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  about  auditing
nd  the  quality  of  ﬁnancial  information  in  the  following
ays:  ﬁrst  at  all,  it  extends  literature  about  the  audit/non-
udit  discussion.  Although  previous  papers  have  studied  if
uditors,  playing  an  information  role, help  to  improve  the
redibility  of  the  ﬁnancial  statements,  there  is  a  lack  of
mpirical  evidence  examining  whether  the  audited  ﬁnan-
ial  information  is  actually  of  higher  quality.  As  far  as  we
now,  only  Minnis  (2011), Ojala  et  al.  (2011)  and  Dedman
nd  Kausar  (2012)  have  examined  the  effect  of  voluntary
udits  on  accounting  quality.  We  complement  these  studies
y  examining  this  association  in  a code-law  country,  and  by
onsidering  also  both  the  effect  of  mandatory  audits  and
2
q
a
t
a
b
i
h
m
q
a
i
t
a
ﬁ
e
u
p
t
t
a
t
i
t
a
a
t
H
e
n
s
t
o
(
I
c
a
l
s
p
i
r
o
c
m
H
l
g
2Audit  and  earnings  management  in  Spanish  SMEs  
the  differences  between  voluntary  and  mandatory  audits.
As  far  as  we  know,  this  is  the  ﬁrst  study  to  test  whether
voluntary  audits  have  a  different  effect  on  earnings  quality
than  mandatory  audits.
On  the  other  hand,  it  contributes  to  the  study  about  the
relationship  between  audit  quality  and  earnings  manage-
ment  in  private  companies  (Vander  Bauwhede  et  al.,  2003;
Cano,  2007;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,  2008).  As  previ-
ous  papers  show  that  the  relationship  between  audit  quality
and  earnings  management  is  affected  by  the  level  of  lit-
igation  risk,  we  examine  if  this  relation  is  also  affected
among  SMEs.  Moreover,  we  extend  the  study  of  audit  qual-
ity,  proxied  by  the  auditor  size,  by  considering  a  Middle-Tier
level  of  auditors  (Boone  et  al.,  2010;  Swanquist  et  al.,
2012).  Finally,  the  paper  is  also  relevant  for  business  in
ethics,  since  earnings  management  is  an  ethical  dilemma
for  accountants  (He  and  Ho,  2011;  He  and  Yang,  2014),  and
the  ethical  perceptions  of  it  may  vary  between  managers
and  auditors,  because  of  their  different  motivations  (Kaplan,
2001a,b).
The rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  Section
‘‘Literature  review  and  hypothesis  development’’  we  review
previous  literature  and  develop  our  research  hypotheses;
Section  ‘‘Empirical  study’’  describes  the  sample  and  the
research  design;  Section  ‘‘Empirical  results’’  reports  the
results  of  the  main  analysis;  Section  ‘‘Additional  analy-
ses’’  reports  the  results  of  the  additional  tests;  and  Section
‘‘Conclusions’’  presents  our  conclusions  and  the  limitations
of  the  study.
Literature review and hypothesis
development
Audit  vs.  non-audit  and  accounting  quality
Auditing,  as  an  activity  consisting  in  the  revision  of  the  ﬁnan-
cial  information,  performs  a  relevant  role  in  guaranteeing
the  credibility  and  reliability  of  the  ﬁnancial  information.
This  assurance  is  provided  by  three  sub-roles  of  the  audit
function  (Cano  and  Sánchez,  2012):  (i)  the  information  role,
which  improves  the  credibility  of  accounting  information
and  helps  to  reduce  ﬁnancing  costs  (Kim  et  al.,  2011);  (ii)
the  monitoring  role, which  helps  to  improve  the  quality  of
the  accounting  information,  by  reducing  the  opportunistic
behaviour  of  managers  (Dedman  and  Kausar,  2012);  and  (iii)
the  insurance  role, which  guarantees  that  users  can  rely  on
the  audited  ﬁnancial  information  because  of  the  responsi-
bility  auditors  assume  in  case  of  audit  failures  (Melumad
and  Thoman,  1990;  Khurana  and  Raman,  2004;  Mansi  et  al.,
2004).
Empirical  evidence  about  the  information  role  of  audits
(Blackwell  et  al.,  1998;  Kim  et  al.,  2011;  Minnis,  2011;  Niemi
et  al.,  2012;  Huguet  and  Gandía,  2014)  supports  the  idea
that  auditing  helps  to  improve  the  credibility  of  the  ﬁnan-
cial  statements,  i.e.  audited  information  is  perceived  to  be
of  higher  quality  that  the  unaudited  one.  However,  empiri-
cal  evidence  about  the  monitoring  role  is  scarce.  As  stated
by  Dechow  et  al.  (2010),  although  the  basic  premise  that
auditors  could  mitigate  misstatements  is  straightforward,
compelling  empirical  evidence  is  limited.  Only  a  few  stud-
ies  (Minnis,  2011;  Ojala  et  al.,  2011;  Dedman  and  Kausar,
t
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012) examine  the  effect  of  voluntary  audits  on  accounting
uality,  while  there  is  no  evidence  on  the  role  of  mandatory
udits.
Minnis  (2011)  examines  the  role  of  the  auditor  in  the  set-
ing  of  US  private  companies,  where  audits  are  voluntary,
nd  ﬁnds  that  auditing  helps  to  reduce  the  cost  of  debt,
ecause  lenders  place  more  weight  on  audited  ﬁnancial
nformation  when  setting  the  interest  rate.  Furthermore,
e  ﬁnds  that  this  increased  credibility  of  the  audited  infor-
ation  is  due  to  the  increase  of  the  actual  accounting
uality,  because  accruals  from  audited  ﬁnancial  statements
re  better  predictors  of  future  cash  ﬂows  and  thus  are  more
nformative.
On  the  other  hand,  Dedman  and  Kausar  (2012)  examine
he  effects  that  the  change  from  mandatory  to  voluntary
udits  had  on  the  credit  ratings  for  UK  private  companies  and
nd  that  those  ﬁrms  that  decided  to  be  voluntarily  audited,
ven  though  reported  lower  average  proﬁts,  obtained
pgrades  to  their  ratings,  i.e.  their  audited  information  was
erceived  as  being  of  higher  quality.  Moreover,  they  also  ﬁnd
hat  voluntarily  audited  companies  report  more  conserva-
ive  ﬁnancial  statements.
Taking  into  account  what  has  been  previously  stated,
nd  in  line  with  the  monitoring  role,  we  expect  that  audi-
ors  oversee  the  relationship  between  the  company  and
ts  stakeholders,  by  checking  the  accounting  and  ensuring
hat  ﬁnancial  statements  have  been  properly  prepared,  thus
s  audits  would  be  a  constraint  to  earnings  management,
udited  SMEs  should  have  lower  discretionary  accruals  than
he  non-audited  ones:
1a.  Audited  SMEs  report  a  signiﬁcantly  lower  level  of
arnings  management  than  non-audited  SMEs.
Nevertheless,  we  have  to  note  that  voluntary  audits  may
ot  necessarily  involve  higher  accounting  quality,  because
ome  ﬁrms  may  choose  to  be  voluntarily  audited  to  increase
he  perceived  quality  of  their  ﬁnancial  statements,  with-
ut  a  true  commitment  on  accounting  quality.  Daske  et  al.
2013)  ﬁnd  that  some  ‘‘label’’  companies  adopt  voluntarily
AS/IFRS  but  do  not  make  material  changes  to  their  ﬁnan-
ial  reporting,  i.e.  they  are  willing  to  feign  that  they  report
ccording  to  IAS/IFRS,  when  they  actually  do  not.  In  this
ine,  Koren  et  al.  (2014)  examine  a  sample  of  Slovenian
mall  ﬁrms  and  ﬁnd  that,  among  voluntarily  audited  com-
anies,  only  those  audited  by  Big  4  auditors  report  ﬁnancial
nformation  of  higher  quality.  Their  results  suggest  that  the
est  of  voluntarily  audited  companies  choose  to  be  audited
nly  to  pretend  higher  perceived  quality.  Therefore,  it  is  not
lear  whether  voluntary  audits  actually  constrain  earnings
anagement:
1b.  Voluntarily  audited  SMEs  report  a  signiﬁcantly  lower
evel  of  earnings  management  than  non-audited  SMEs.
On  the  other  hand,  mandatory  audits  are  expected  to
uarantee  a  minimum  accounting  quality  (Ruiz  and  Gómez,
008).  Moreover,  as  stated  by  Dedman  and  Kausar  (2012),
here  is  a  concern  among  audit  ﬁrms  that  a  potential  conse-
uence  of  audit  exemption  may  be  a  reduction  in  the  quality
f  the  ﬁnancial  reporting.  Therefore,  companies  that  shun
he  audit  requirement  would  report  accounting  information
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f  lower  quality.  However,  an  alternate  view  is  that  some
andatorily  audited  companies  may  be  only  passive  compli-
nt  with  the  audit  requirement,  and  thus  may  choose  more
ermissive  auditors.  Moreover,  among  the  SMEs,  it  has  been
rgued  that  the  ﬁnancial  information  has  a  more  limited  use-
ulness,  compared  to  the  larger  companies,  because  lenders
ely  more  in  alternative  information  sources  (Berger  and
dell,  2006),  so  mandatory  audits  would  be  a  legal  require-
ent,  rather  than  a  social  need  (Navarro  and  Martínez,
004),  what  supports  the  idea  of  passive  compliant  com-
anies.  Therefore,  we  also  formulate  H1  for  mandatory
udits:
1c.  Mandatorily  audited  SMEs  report  a  signiﬁcantly  lower
evel  of  earnings  management  than  SMEs  non-compliant  with
he  audit  requirement.
oluntary  audits  vs.  mandatory  audits  and
ccounting quality
here  is  scarce  research  about  whether  the  differences
etween  voluntary  and  mandatory  audits  involve  differences
n  the  audit  outcomes  (Lennox  and  Pittman,  2011;  Kim  et  al.,
011;  Huguet  and  Gandía,  2014,  2015).  Lennox  and  Pittman
2011)  examine  a  sample  of  UK  small  companies  and  ﬁnd
hat  voluntary  audits  have  a  signalling  effect  that  disappears
hen  companies  are  mandatorily  audited,  and  companies
hat  choose  to  be  voluntarily  audited  beneﬁt  from  upgrades
n  their  credit  ratings.  These  results  are  similar  to  those
btained  by  Kim  et  al.  (2011),  who  ﬁnd  that  Korean  com-
anies  with  voluntary  audits  have  greater  interest  savings
han  those  mandatorily  audited.
In  the  Spanish  setting,  Huguet  and  Gandía  (2014)  do  not
nd  a  signiﬁcant  relationship  between  voluntary  audits  and
he  cost  of  debt,  but  ﬁnd  that  companies  that  breach  the
udit  requirement  have  a  higher  cost  of  debt  that  those
andatorily  audited,  what  suggests  an  asymmetric  effect
f  voluntary/mandatory  audits  on  the  cost  of  debt.  In  a
ore  recent  paper,  Huguet  and  Gandía  (2015)  examine  dif-
erences  in  audit  pricing  between  voluntary  and  mandatory
udits.
Therefore,  previous  literature  generally  shows  that  vol-
ntary  and  mandatory  audits  involve  differences  in  their
udit  outcomes.  To  date,  however,  there  is  no  research
bout  whether  accounting  quality  is  affected  by  the  audit
tatus.  Nevertheless,  and  considering  prior  literature,  we
an  expect  that  differences  in  earnings  quality  may  arise.
ollowing  the  reasoning  for  H1b  and  H1c,  we  can  expect
hat  voluntarily  audited  companies  have  a  higher  commit-
ent  with  accounting  quality,  while  some  of  the  mandatorily
udited  companies  may  be  only  passive  compliant.  It  may
nvolve  that,  although  mandatory  audits  may  have  a  posi-
ive  effect  on  earnings  quality,  the  effect  of  voluntary  audits
ay  be  even  stronger.  On  a  competing  view,  we  can  expect
hat  voluntarily  audited  companies  may  report  higher  levels
f  earnings  management  than  mandatorily  audited  compa-
ies,  because  auditors  face  lower  visibility  and  litigation
isks  in  the  voluntary  setting,  and  thus  may  be  more  permis-
ive  than  when  performing  mandatory  audits.  Therefore,  we
ormulate  our  second  Hypothesis  in  null  form:
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2.  There  are  no  differences  in  the  level  of  earnings
anagement  between  voluntarily  audited  SMEs  and  the
andatorily  audited  ones.
udit  quality  and  accounting  quality
ost  of  previous  literature  examines  the  effect  of  spe-
iﬁc  characteristics  of  audits,  proxies  for  audit  quality,
n  accounting  quality  and  earnings  management,  because
t  is  considered  that  high  quality  audits  are  a  constraint
o  earnings  management  and  an  element  that  improves
ccounting  quality  (Becker  et  al.,  1998;  Balsam  et  al.,
003;  Cano,  2007).  Several  characteristics  of  auditors  have
een  used  as  a  measure  of  audit  quality,  such  as  auditor
pecialization  (Balsam  et  al.,  2003),  audit  and  non-audit
ees  (Basioudis  et  al.,  2008;  Carmona  and  Momparler,
011),  or  auditor  tenure  (Chung  et  al.,  2005;  Carey  and
imnett,  2006),  but  auditor  size,  through  the  dichotomy
ig  4/Rest  of  auditors,  is  the  most  common  proxy  for  audit
uality,  because  large  auditors  are  considered  more  pro-
essionally  competent  (Becker  et  al.,  1998;  Francis  et  al.,
999)  and  independent  (DeAngelo,  1981).  Moreover,  it  is
ssumed  that  large  auditors  face  greater  losses  than  the
est  of  auditors,  not  only  economic  losses  derived  from
he  insurance  role  and  the  perception  that  large  audi-
ors  are  ‘‘deep  pockets’’  (Khurana  and  Raman,  2004;
ansi  et  al.,  2004),  but  also  reputational  (DeAngelo,
981).
In  general,  these  studies  ﬁnd  that  Big  4  auditors  are  asso-
iated  with  higher  accounting  quality,  because  Big  4  auditors
estrain  earnings  management  more  than  small  auditors
Becker  et  al.,  1998;  Francis  et  al.,  1999;  Balsam  et  al.,
003;  Cano,  2007;  Jara  and  López,  2007)  and  are  related
ith  a  higher  level  of  conditional  conservatism  (Chung  et  al.,
003;  Francis  and  Wang,  2008;  Cano,  2010).  In  the  Spanish
etting,  although  Navarro  and  Martínez  (2004)  do  not  ﬁnd  a
igniﬁcant  effect,  later  papers  on  both  public  and  private
ompanies  (Jara  and  López,  2007;  Cano,  2007) ﬁnd  that  Big
 auditors  are  associated  to  lower  levels  of  earnings  man-
gement.
Although  most  of  previous  literature  shows  a negative
ssociation  between  auditor  size  and  earnings  management,
ater  papers  go  into  the  relationship  between  audit  quality
nd  earnings  management,  by  looking  for  factors  that  affect
his  relation,  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  Big  4  auditors  to
onstrain  earnings  management,  such  as  the  auditor  conser-
atism  (Kim  et  al.,  2003;  Cano,  2010) and  the  visibility  and
itigation  risk  of  auditors  (Vander  Bauwhede  et  al.,  2003;  Van
endeloo  and  Vanstraelen,  2008).
Regarding  the  auditor  conservatism,  the  auditors’
ehaviour  is  generally  conservative,  in  the  sense  that  they
ave  preference  for  income-decreasing  accounting  choices
nstead  of  income-increasing  ones.  This  behaviour  involves
wo  negative  effects  for  accounting  quality:  (i)  it  increases
ot  only  the  level  of  conditional  conservatism,  (i.e.  asym-
etrical  recognitions  of  good  and  bad  news,  which  is
onsidered  desirable),  but  also  the  level  of  unconditional
onservatism  (early  recognition  of  losses,  independently  of
he  news),  which  can  reduce  the  quality  of  accounting  infor-
ation  (Cano,  2010);  and  (ii)  when  managers  have  incentives
o  manage  downward,  Big  4  auditors  are  not  effective  to
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deter  earnings  management  (Kim  et  al.,  2003;  Francis  and
Krishnan,  1999).
With  regard  to  the  visibility  and  litigation  risk,  we
stated  before  that  Big  4  auditors  have  incentives  to  per-
form  higher  quality  audits  because  of  the  potential  losses
they  face,  both  economic  (derived  from  the  litigation
risk)  and  reputational  (derived  from  their  visibility).  In
settings  with  lower  litigation  risk  and  visibility,  these
incentives  may  be  reduced  or  even  disappear,  thus  Big
4  auditors  would  not  be  more  effective  than  the  rest
of  auditors  in  constraining  earnings  management  (Vander
Bauwhede  et  al.,  2003;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,
2008).
On  the  other  hand,  previous  studies  do  not  test  the
role  of  Middle-Tier  auditors,  in  spite  of  being  considered  to
provide  a  similar  quality  than  Big  4  auditors  (Boone  et  al.,
2010;  Sundgren  and  Svanström,  2013).  We  examine  if  Big
4  and  Middle-Tier  auditors  provide  similar  audit  quality.
Therefore,  we  formulate  our  third  Hypothesis  for  both  large
auditors  (Big  4  and  Middle-Tier)  and  separately  for  Big  4
auditors:
H3a.  The  level  of  earnings  management  is  signiﬁcantly
lower  for  SMEs  audited  by  large  auditors  than  for  SMEs
audited  by  small  auditors.
H3b.  The  level  of  earnings  management  is  signiﬁcantly
lower  for  SMEs  audited  by  Big  4  auditors  than  for  SMEs
audited  by  non-Big  4  auditors.
Empirical study
Sample  and  descriptive  statistics
For  the  selection  of  the  sample  we  have  used  SABI,  a
database  that  contains  ﬁnancial  data  from  ﬁnancial  state-
ments  of  Spanish  companies  submitted  to  Registro  Mercantil
(Spanish  Company  Register).  Our  sample  period  covers  since
2008--2013.  We  initially  select  private  companies  which  have
been,  for  the  whole  sample  period,  below  at  least  two
out  of  the  three  following  thresholds:  D  6,000,000  Total
Assets,  D  12,000,000  Turnover  and  50  employees.  These  lim-
its  are  the  upper  thresholds  established  by  the  Directive,
2013/34/EU  to  consider  a  company  is  small  and  thus  to  be
exempt  from  the  audit  requirement.
In  practice,  however,  most  of  EU  members  apply  lower
Statutory  Audit  Thresholds  (SAT).  In  Spain,  private  compa-
nies  are  exempt  to  be  audited  if  they  do  not  exceed  two
out  of  these  criteria  for  two  consecutive  years:  total  assets
of  D  2,850,000  (D  2,374,000  until  2007);  net  turnover  of
D  5,700,000  (D  4,748,000  until  2007);  and  (iii)  50  employees.
The  use  of  the  upper  EU  limits  let  us  examine  the  effects
of  both  voluntary  and  mandatory  audits  on  earnings  man-
agement,  but  avoiding  an  excessive  variation  in  company
size  within  the  sample.  Therefore,  our  sample  includes  small
companies  below  Spanish  SAT  (and  thus  ‘‘a  priori1’’  exempt
1 SABI does not contain information about the reason companies
are audited, thus we cannot differentiate between mandatory or
voluntary audits when companies are below legal thresholds.
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rom  the  audit  requirement)  and  the  ‘‘small’’  medium  com-
anies  above  Spanish  SAT  (i.e.  required  to  be  audited).  Since
he  selection  process  excludes  the  companies  that  have  been
bove  the  EU  thresholds  in  some  years  of  the  sample  period
nd  this  could  be  producing  a  survivorship  bias,  we  do  an
dditional  test  by  including  the  companies  below  the  EU
hresholds  in  any  of  the  years  of  the  period  (rather  than
n  the  whole  period).
Furthermore,  in  order  to  achieve  a  sample  with  more
omogeneous  characteristics,  we  only  include  companies
hat  have  been  audited  at  least  once  over  the  sample  period,
ecause  companies  that  have  never  been  audited  are  prob-
bly  much  smaller  than  those  near  SAT,  and  the  accounting
nformation  of  audited  companies  and  never-audited  com-
anies  may  be  not  comparable.  In  an  additional  test,  in  order
o  test  if  this  exclusion  affects  our  results,  we  include  the
bservations  of  the  never-audited  companies.
For  the  same  reason,  we  also  exclude  the  observations  of
ompanies  that  are  considered  micro-ﬁrms  under  Directive,
013/34/EU  (companies  that  do  not  meet  two  of  the  follow-
ng  thresholds:  (i)  D  350,000  in  total  assets;  (ii)  D  700,000  in
et  turnover;  and  (iii)  less  than  10  employees).  Companies
elonging  to  ﬁnancial  and  insurance  industries,  ﬁrms  hav-
ng  unlimited  liability2 and  ﬁrms  with  share  participation
y  public  entities  are  also  excluded.  Finally,  we  eliminate
bservations  that  have  no  information  to  calculate  accruals
nd  also  observations  with  strange  values  (negative  values
or  assets,  debt  or  ﬁnancing  expenses).
Table  1  Panel  A  shows  that  the  ﬁnal  sample  has  34,562
rm-year  observations  from  8066  companies,  with  9181
bservations  from  non-audited  companies  (7634  of  them
re  from  observations  below  SAT  and  908  are  observations
rom  companies  that  breach  the  audit  requirement),  and
5,381  observations  from  audited  companies  (4278  below
AT  and  20,683  above  SAT  and  thus  mandatorily  audited
ecause  of  size).  As  companies  must  meet  the  thresholds
or  two  consecutive  years,  1967  observations  (1328  from
udited  companies  and  639  from  unaudited  companies)  are
ot  classiﬁed  in  either  range  because  they  do  not  satisfy
he  criteria  to  be  considered  either  below  or  above  SAT  and
hus  are  excluded  from  our  analysis.  We  have  to  remark
hat  the  relatively  low  number  of  observations  below  SAT
s  explained  by  the  exclusion  of  the  never-audited  compa-
ies.  As  we  have  stated  before,  we  do  an  additional  analysis
ncluding  the  never-audited  companies  to  test  how  results
re  affected.
Table  1  Panel  B  shows  the  sample  distribution  of  audited
MEs  by  auditor  choice  (Big  4/Middle-Tier/rest  of  audi-
ors).  It  should  be  pointed  out  the  low  proportion  of
ompanies  audited  by  large  auditors,  although  the  pro-
ortion  of  companies  that  choose  to  be  audited  by  either
 Big  4  or  a  Middle-Tier  auditor  is  higher  among  the
bservations  below  SAT  than  among  the  larger  ones.  In
able  2  we  show  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  continu-
us  variables.  We  observe  that,  on  average,  discretionary
ccruals  are  negative,  thus  consistent  with  prior  literature
Arnedo  et  al.,  2007;  García  Lara  et  al.,  2005),  earnings-
ecreasing  behaviour  is  more  pervasive  among  private
2 Spanish companies with limited liability are the Sociedad Anón-
ma  (SA) and Sociedad Limitada (SL).
176  D.  Huguet,  J.L.  Gandía
Table  1  Sample  distribution.
Panel  A:  Sample  distribution  by  audit  status
Below  SAT  Above  SAT  Unknown  Total
Year  No  audit  Audit  Total  No  audit  Audit  Total  No  audit  Audit  Total  No  audit  Audit  Total
2008  56  54  110  118  2490  2608  100  355  455  274  2899  3173
2009 1121  487  1608  207  3911  4118  146  175  321  1474  4573  6047
2010 1799  668  2467  159  3327  3486  138  310  448  2096  4305  6401
2011 1574  931  2505  135  3442  3577  92  183  275  1801  4556  6357
2012 1515  985  2500  122  3557  3679  99  151  250  1736  4693  6429
2013 1569  1153  2722  167  3048  3215  64  154  218  1800  4355  6155
Total 7634  4278  11,912  908  19,775  20,683  639  1328  1967  9181  25,381  34,562
Panel B:  Sample  distribution  of  audited  companies  by  auditor  choice
Below  SAT  Above  SAT  Unknown  Total
Year  Small  M-Tier  Big  Small  M-Tier  Big  Small  M-Tier  Big  Small  M-Tier  Big
2008  32  14  8  2083  240  167  306  31  18  2421  285  193
2009 367  68  52  3238  406  267  135  18  22  3740  492  341
2010 496  91  81  2684  362  281  249  38  23  3429  491  385
2011 715  111  105  2761  381  300  147  25  11  3623  517  416
2012 729  135  121  2849  379  329  106  27  18  3684  541  468
2013 858  160  135  2435  350  263  121  18  15  3414  528  413
Total 3197  579  502  16,050  2118  1607  1064  157  107  20,311  2854  2216
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be  partially  overcome  by  changing  some  of  these  ‘‘blank(%) (74.73%)  (13.53%)  (11.73%)  (81.16%)  (10.71%)  (8
rms.  On  the  other  hand,  on  average,  unaudited  compa-
ies  have  more  negative  total  accruals  and  higher  absolute
iscretionary  accruals.  Moreover,  audited  companies  are
arger,  have  higher  leverage  and  less  liquidity,  and  are
lder.
esearch  model
e  test  the  Hypotheses  with  the  following  regression
odels:
Mit =  ˛  +  ˇ1AUDITit +  ˇ2VOLit +  ˇ3LARGEit
+  ˇ4VOL  LARGEit +  ˇ5BIGit +  ˇ6VOL  BIGit
+  CONTROL  +  εit (1)
Mit =  ˛  +  ˇ1LARGEit +  ˇ2VOL  LARGEit +  ˇ3BIGit
+  ˇ4VOL  BIGit +  CONTROL  +  εit (2)
The  dependent  variable  in  both  models  is  the  level
f  earnings  management  (EM).  Since  this  variable  is  not
irectly  observed,  we  use  a  proxy  based  on  the  level  of  dis-
retionary  accruals  (DA).  The  discretionary  accruals  models
ssume  that  the  accruals  that  are  not  explained  by  innate
actors,  which  are  a  consequence  of  the  company’s  activi-
ies,  are  a  measure  of  the  level  of  earnings  management.
d
G
m)  (80.12%)  (11.82%)  (8.06%)  (80.02%)  (11.24%)  (8.73%)
e  estimate  discretionary  accruals3 using  the  Jones  Model
1991)  and  the  absolute  value  of  the  discretionary  accruals
s  considered  the  measure  of  earnings  management.
Some  studies  (Hribar  and  Nichols,  2007;  Francis  and
ang,  2008;  Dedman  and  Kausar,  2012) use  the  signed
iscretionary  accruals  rather  than  their  absolute  value.  Fol-
owing  Arnedo  et  al.  (2007),  we  consider  that  SMEs  may  have
ncentives  to  manage  earnings  downward  because  of  tax
ssues,  whereas  income  increasing  behaviours  may  be  less
requent  because  of  the  limited  usefulness  of  accounting
nformation  for  lenders  (García  Lara  et  al.,  2005;  Berger  and
dell,  2006;  Gill  de  Albornoz  and  Illueca,  2007).  Therefore,
e  also  regress  the  models  separately  for  positive  and  neg-
tive  accruals.  In  an  additional  analysis,  we  use  alternative
easures  of  earnings  management.
Model  [1]  includes  AUDIT, which  equals  1  when  com-
anies  are  audited  and  0  otherwise.  We  have  to  note,
owever,  that  SABI  presents  problems  with  the  identiﬁca-
ion  of  audited  companies.  When  a  company  is  not  audited
n  t,  the  data  is  left  blank  in  the  database.  However,  some
f  these  blank  data  are  really  missing  observations.  There-
ore,  ‘‘blank  data’’  may  be  either  unaudited  or  audited  (but
issing)  observations,  thus  some  audited  observations  may
e  erroneously  considered  non-audited.  This  limitation  canata’’  observations  to  ‘‘audited’’  observations  (Huguet  and
andía,  2014).  Considering  that  the  shortest  auditor  tenure
3 We  need at least 6 observations by each industry-year to esti-
ate discretionary accruals.
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics  of  continuous  variables.
Panel  A:  Distributional  properties  of  continuous  variables  (32,595  observations)
Variable  Mean  Std.  dev.  1%  25%  50%  75%  99%
+/−DA  −0.0072  0.1360  −0.3766  −0.0694  −0.0075  0.0534  0.3824
|DA| 0.0907  0.1016  0.0010  0.0275  0.0617  0.1187  0.4592
TA −0.0368  0.1443  −0.4152  −0.1012  −0.0375  0.0243  0.3614
SIZE 8.6574  0.7361  7.0198  8.2198  8.5560  8.9942  10.9354
LEV 0.5711  0.2383  0.0886  0.3934  0.5807  0.7468  1.1872
GROWTH −0.0308 0.2783  −0.6674  −0.1679  −0.0388  0.0721  1.1205
ROA 0.0137 0.0681 −0.2425 −0.0054 0.0110  0.0387  0.2376
LIQ 1.9826 1.8311 0.1826 1.0319 1.4221 2.1873  11.1468
AGE 22.0518 10.9984 5.0000 14.0000 21.0000 28.0000 54.0000
Panel  B:  Mean  and  standard  deviation  of  variables  by  audit  status
Non  audited  Audited  Test  for  mean  differences
Variable  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  diff  t  p-Value
+/−DA 8542  −0.0058 0.1432 24,053  −0.0077  0.1334  0.0020  1.14  0.127
|DA| 8542 0.0935 0.1086 24,053  0.0897  0.0990  0.0038  2.94  0.002
TA 8542 −0.0396 0.1611 24,053  −0.0358  0.1378  −0.0038  −2.07  0.019
SIZE 8542  8.4460  0.7856  24,053  8.7324  0.7026  −0.2865  −31.36  0.000
LEV 8542  0.5663  0.2467  24,053  0.5728  0.2352  −0.0065  −2.17  0.015
GROWTH 8542  0.0212  0.3519  24,053  −0.0492  0.2443  0.0704  20.22  0.000
ROA 8542  0.0079  0.0735  24,053  0.0157  0.0659  −0.0078  −9.16  0.000
LIQ 8542  2.0992  2.0184  24,053  1.9411  1.7580  0.1581  6.86  0.000
AGE 8542  20.9348  10.5710  24,053  22.4485  11.1195  −1.5137  −10.95  0.000
Non audited  below  SAT  Audited  below  SAT  Test  for  mean  differences
Variable  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Diff  t  p-Value
+/−DA 7634  −0.0057 0.1440  4278  −0.0111  0.1402  0.0054  1.98  0.024
|DA| 7634 0.0938  0.1094  4278  0.0901  0.1080  0.0036  1.75  0.040
TA 7634 −0.0402 0.1634  4278  −0.0479  0.1491  0.0077  2.53  0.006
SIZE 7634  8.4186  0.7993  4278  8.5446  0.9172  −0.1261  −7.83  0.000
LEV 7634  0.5610  0.2482  4278  0.5426  0.2537  0.0184  3.86  0.000
GROWTH 7634  0.0319  0.3619  4278  0.0261  0.3329  0.0058  0.86  0.195
ROA 7634  0.0070  0.0739  4278  0.0052  0.0745  0.0018  1.31  0.096
LIQ 7634  2.1361  2.0638  4278  2.0788  2.1163  0.0573  1.44  0.075
AGE 7634  20.9925  10.6194  4278  22.4353  11.9685  −1.4427  −6.79  0.000
Non audited  above  SAT  Audited  above  SAT  Test  for  mean  differences
Variable  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Diff  t  p-Value
+/−DA  908  −0.0065  0.1364  19,775  −0.0070  0.1318  0.0005  0.12  0.453
|DA| 908  0.0908  0.1020  19,775  0.0896  0.0970  0.0011  0.35  0.364
TA 908 −0.0343  0.1410  19,775  −0.0332  0.1351  −0.0011  −0.24  0.406
SIZE 908  8.6765  0.6132  19,775  8.7731  0.6397  −0.0966  −4.46  0.000
LEV 908  0.6108  0.2292  19,775  0.5794  0.2305  0.0315  4.02  0.000
GROWTH 908  −0.0684  0.2348  19,775  −0.0655  0.2171  −0.0029  −0.39  0.349
ROA 908  0.0148  0.0693  19,775  0.0180  0.0637  −0.0032  −1.46  0.072
LIQ 908  1.7892  1.5525  19,775  1.9114  1.6689  −0.1222  −2.16  0.015
2AGE 908  20.4493  10.1479  19,775  
in  Spain  is  three  years,  if:  (a)  a  company  is  audited  in  t  −  1
and  t  +  1;  and  (b)  is  above  SAT  in  t,  we  consider  the  com-
pany  is  audited  in  t.  We  applied  this  improvement  and  664
observations  with  blank  data  were  changed  to  audited  obser-
vations.
p
o
t
a2.4514  10.9274  −2.0020  −5.41  0.000
Furthermore,  we  include  VOL, which  equals  1  when  com-
any  is  voluntarily  audited  and  0  otherwise.  The  introduction
f  this  variable  let  us  test  the  differential  effect  of  volun-
ary  audits  over  mandatory  audits:  the  effect  of  mandatory
udits  is  observed  from  ˇ1, while  the  sum  of  ˇ1 +  ˇ2 captures
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he  effect  of  voluntary  audits.  Therefore,  we  can  test
imultaneously  the  differences  between  audited  and  unau-
ited  observations  (Hypothesis  1),  as  well  as  the  differences
etween  voluntary  and  mandatory  audits  (Hypothesis  3).
On  the  other  hand,  the  auditor  choice  may  affect  the
evel  of  earnings  management  among  the  audited  compa-
ies,  so  we  include  two  audit-based  variables  more:  BIG,
hich  equals  1  for  companies  audited  by  a  Big  4  auditor  and
 otherwise;  and  LARGE,  which  equals  1  when  companies  are
udited  by  large  auditors  (either  Middle-Tier  or  Big  4  audit
rms)  and  0  otherwise.  We  have  considered  an  audit  ﬁrm  is
 Middle-Tier  auditor  when  this  ﬁrm  has  revenues  for  audit
ees  higher  than  D  9,000,000  in  2010  and  2011.4 These  ﬁrms,
lthough  smaller  than  the  Big  4,  operate  in  several  regions  of
he  country  and  have  also  signiﬁcant  revenues  from  consul-
ing  and  tax  services.  BIG  captures  the  differences  between
ig  4  and  Middle-Tier  auditors,  while  LARGE  captures  the
ifferences  between  both  types  of  large  audit  ﬁrms  and  the
est  of  auditors.  Since  the  effect  of  the  Big  4  and  Middle-Tier
uditors  may  change  between  the  voluntary  and  the  manda-
ory  setting,  we  also  include  the  interaction  terms  between
hese  two  variables  and  VOL.
Regarding  Model  [2],  we  use  this  model  in  the  sample
f  audited  companies,  and  thus  we  exclude  AUDIT  from  it.
esults  from  this  model  support  the  results  of  Model  [1]  for
ypotheses  2  and  3,  but  focusing  only  on  the  differences
etween  auditors.
We  include  in  both  models  a  set  of  control  variables  that
ave  been  used  in  previous  research,  which  are  deﬁned  in
ppendix.  Company  size  (SIZE) is  measured  as  the  natural
ogarithm  of  total  assets  (Balsam  et  al.,  2003;  Kim  et  al.,
003;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,  2008).  Although  earlier
apers  predict  a  positive  association  between  earnings  man-
gement  and  size  as  a  consequence  of  decreasing-income
ccruals  to  avoid  political  costs  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;
atts  and  Zimmerman,  1986),  recent  papers  show  that  com-
any  size  is  positively  associated  with  earnings  quality  (from
hom  earnings  management  is  an  inverse  measure)  because
f  the  economies  of  scale  to  produce  higher  quality  infor-
ation  (Ashbaugh-Skaife  et  al.,  2007)  and  a  stricter  control
y  the  public  and  government  (Arnedo  et  al.,  2007).  On
he  other  hand,  we  measure  leverage  (LEV) as  the  ratio  of
otal  liabilities  to  total  assets  (DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994;
ecker  et  al.,  1998;  Reynolds  and  Francis,  2000).  Since  man-
gers  have  incentives  to  not  meet  the  debt  covenants,  we
xpect  a  positive  association  between  leverage  and  earnings
anagement  (DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994).
Company  growth  (GROWTH)  is  measured  as  the  sales
rowth  (Khurana  and  Raman,  2004;  Chen  et  al.,  2008).  We
xpect  that  companies  with  problems  have  more  incen-
ives  to  engage  in  earnings  management,  so  the  association
etween  GROWTH  and  EM  should  be  negative.  Proﬁtabil-
ty  (ROA) is  measured  as  the  Return-On-Assets,  calculated
s  the  ratio  of  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes  to  total
ssets  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  (Velury  and  Jenkins,
006;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,  2008).  We  measure
iquidity  (LIQ)  as  the  ratio  of  current  assets  to  current
4 These data have been collected from the Spanish newspaper
xpansión. This newspaper prepares a yearly ranking of the 40--50
op auditors in Spain by total fees and audit fees.
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iabilities  (Butler  et  al.,  2004;  Caramanis  and  Lennox,  2008).
 EARN  is  a  dummy  that  equals  1  if  the  company  has  neg-
tive  earnings  and  0 otherwise  (Francis  et  al.,  1999;  Jara
nd  López,  2007).  We  expect  a  positive  association  between
EARN  and  EM.  Finally,  the  age  of  the  company  (AGE) is
easured  as  its  age  since  its  creation  (Myers  et  al.,  2003;
hen  et  al.,  2008).  The  models  include  year  dummies  to
ontrol  for  unobserved  time-speciﬁc  effects  common  to  all
ompanies.
Previous  literature  shows  that  the  use  of  audit-based
ariables  is  often  affected  by  endogeneity  problems  (Kim
t  al.,  2011;  Cano  and  Sánchez,  2012).  They  may  appear
ecause  the  test  variables  LARGE  and  BIG  are  the  result  of
 corporate  decision  to  choose  the  type  of  auditor  rather
han  a  random  assignment,  a  problem  also  present  in  AUDIT
nd  VOL  for  observations  below  SAT  considering  that  these
rms  decide  to  be  (or  not)  audited.  Therefore,  OLS  estima-
ions  are  not  proper  because  they  are  biased.  Some  studies
ry  to  mitigate  the  endogeneity  problems  through  a  Heck-
an  two-stage  approach  (Chaney  et  al.,  2004;  Mansi  et  al.,
004;  Pittman  and  Fortin,  2004;  Monterrey  and  Sánchez,
007).  Nevertheless,  recent  literature  (Clatworthy  et  al.,
009;  Larcker  and  Rusticus,  2010;  Lennox  et  al.,  2012)  shows
hat  the  Heckman  results  depend  on  a  proper  selection  of
he  instrumental  variables,  are  fragile,  and  can  be  even
ore  unreliable  than  the  OLS  estimation.  Kim  et  al.  (2011)
nd  Lennox  et  al.  (2012)  state  that  the  use  of  ﬁxed-effects
egressions  can  mitigate  the  potential  endogeneity  issues
s  long  as  the  unobserved  source  of  endogeneity  is  time-
nvariant.  Therefore,  we  estimate  Eqs.  (1)  and  (2)  using  a
rm  ﬁxed-effects  (FE)  regression  procedure.
However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  FE  estimation  is
nly  a  partial  solution  to  endogeneity  problems,  because
t  does  not  allow  a simultaneous  equation  approach  when
he  relation  between  the  dependent  and  the  test  variable
s  bidirectional,  and  because  the  FE  regression  only  solves
he  endogeneity  problem  when  the  source  of  endogeneity  is
xed  over  time.
mpirical results
his  section  presents  the  results  of  the  main  analysis.  First,
e  compute  a  correlation  matrix  (Table  3)  to  examine  poten-
ial  multicollinearity  problems.  The  highest  correlation  is
.9515  between  discretionary  and  total  accruals,  showing
hat  most  of  accruals  are  abnormal  according  to  our  model
o  estimate  discretionary  accruals.  Nevertheless,  TA  is  not
sed  in  the  regressions,  so  there  are  no  problems  associ-
ted  with  this  association.  Furthermore,  we  use  TA  as  the
ependent  variable  in  an  additional  analysis.  Other  high  cor-
elations  are  among  AUDIT  and  SIZE  (0.6088),  BIG  and  LARGE
0.6632),  and  ROA  and  NEG  EARN  (0.5347).  However,  as  all
he  correlations  are  below  0.80,  we  do  not  expect  collinea-
ity  problems  (Judge  et  al.,  1988;  Firth,  1997;  Carmona  and
omparler,  2011).
We  then  run  models  [1]  and  [2]  in  the  samples  explained
n  Section  ‘‘Sample  and  descriptive  statistics’’  using  abso-
ute  and  signed  discretionary  accruals  as  our  measure  of
arnings  quality.  Table  4  Panel  A  shows  the  results  from
odel  [1],  whereas  Panel  B  shows  the  results  from  Model
2]  in  the  sub-sample  of  audited  companies.
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Regarding  Hypothesis  1, we  observe  in  Column  1  of  Panel
 that  AUDIT  is  signiﬁcantly  negative  when  we  consider
nsigned  accruals,  what  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that
uditing  provides  a constraint  for  earnings  management
ctivities.  Its  coefﬁcient  remains  signiﬁcant  when  we  con-
ider  positive  accruals  but  becomes  insigniﬁcant  when  we
se  negative  accruals.  These  results  suggest  that  audits  help
o  mitigate  increasing  earnings  management,  but  they  do
ot  have  a  signiﬁcant  effect  when  companies  have  incen-
ives  to  manage  downwards.  This  is  consistent  with  the
xplanation  that  when  small  companies  have  incentives
or  decreasing  earnings  behaviours,  e.g.  for  tax  purposes,
udits  do  not  work  to  restrain  them,  probably  because  the
uditor  conservatism  considers  this  behaviour  somewhat
cceptable.
With  regard  to  Hypothesis  2,  VOL  is  signiﬁcantly  posi-
ive  in  columns  1  and  2  but  its  coefﬁcient  is  lower  than
hat  of  AUDIT. These  results,  also  supported  in  Panel  B  of
able  4,  suggest  that  although  both  voluntary  and  mandatory
udits  help  to  mitigate  increasing  earnings  management,
he  effect  of  voluntary  audits  is  somewhat  lower.  Therefore,
uditors  seem  to  be  more  permissive  when  performing  vol-
ntary  audits,  what  may  be  explained  by  the  lower  visibility
nd  litigation  risks  faced  by  auditors  in  this  setting.
With  regard  to  Hypothesis  3,  results  do  not  support  a
igniﬁcant  effect  of  Big  4  or  Middle-Tier  auditors  on  account-
ng  quality  and  suggest  that  high  quality  auditors  are  not
ore  effective  than  the  rest  of  auditors  against  earnings
anagements  in  the  SMEs  setting.  Only  Column  1  of  Panel
 shows  a  negative  (though  weakly  signiﬁcant)  coefﬁcient
or  BIG, while  the  negative  coefﬁcient  of  LARGE  in  Panel  A
hen  considering  negative  accruals  is  in  line  with  auditors
eing  more  permissive  with  decreasing  earnings  behaviours
ecause  of  their  conservatism.  Therefore,  in  response  to
ypothesis  3, we  cannot  ﬁnd  evidence  that  SMEs  audited  by
arge  auditors  (either  Big  4  or  Middle-Tier  auditors)  engage
ess  in  earnings  management  than  the  companies  audited  by
he  smaller  auditors,  a  result  that  may  be  a  consequence  of
he  low  litigation  risk  in  the  SMEs  environment.
Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen  (2008)  show  that,  although
he  litigation  risk  in  the  setting  of  private  companies  is
ower  than  the  setting  of  the  listed  ones,  Big  4  auditors
ontinue  to  be  more  effective  in  countries  where  there
s  a high  alignment  between  accounting  and  tax,  because
f  the  authorities’  scrutinize  of  the  ﬁnancial  statements
eplaces  the  role  of  investors,  which  increases  the  likeli-
ood  of  detecting  an  auditor  failure  and  therefore  affecting
egatively  the  auditor  reputation.  In  the  case  of  the  SMEs,
ecause  of  their  little  visibility  and  lacking  litigation  risk,
arger  auditors  may  not  have  incentives  to  do  a better  job
han  the  rest  of  the  auditors.
Regarding  the  control  variables,  SIZE, LEV, ROA, LIQ,
EG  EARN  and  AGE  are  signiﬁcant  and  have  the  predicted
ign  in  most  of  the  regressions.
dditional analyseslternative  samples
e  explained  in  Section  ‘‘Sample  and  descriptive  statis-
ics’’  that  the  sample  is  composed  of  companies  that  have
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Table  4  Regression  results.
Panel  A:  Model  1
|DA| +DA  −DA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
AUDIT  −0.0061  −3.03  0.002  −0.0138  −3.83  0.000  −0.0021  −0.72  0.469
VOL 0.0047 1.68 0.094  0.0137  2.67  0.008  0.0004  0.11  0.912
LARGE 0.0046 1.08 0.281 0.0009  0.12  0.905  −0.0115  −1.92  0.055
VOL LARGE 0.0036 0.52 0.603 0.0021 0.16 0.874 0.0017  0.18  0.858
BIG −0.0073  −1.03  0.305  0.0152  1.12  0.264  0.0098  0.99  0.324
VOL BIG  −0.0085  −0.86  0.392  −0.0183  −0.96  0.337  0.0134  0.97  0.331
SIZE −0.0060  −1.76  0.078  0.0203  3.12  0.002  0.0288  5.94  0.000
LEV 0.1230  22.13  0.000  0.2097  16.90  0.000  −0.0854  −11.53  0.000
GROWTH 0.0000  0.86  0.390  −0.0004  −1.05  0.296  0.0000  −0.85  0.397
ROA −0.0273  −2.58  0.010  0.0932  5.23  0.000  0.1826  11.41  0.000
LIQ 0.0004  1.37  0.170  0.0031  4.79  0.000  0.0021  4.25  0.000
N EARN  0.0036  1.92  0.055  0.0009  0.25  0.806  0.0003  0.10  0.920
AGE −0.0041  −8.56  0.000  −0.0060  −7.24  0.000  0.0032  4.54  0.000
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept 0.1695  5.30  0.000  −0.0646  −1.13  0.259  −0.3648  −7.76  0.000
N 32,595  15,205  17,390
R2 3.13%  5.73%  5.97%
F 46.53  29.44  37.74
Panel  B:  Model  2
|DA| +DA  −DA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
VOL  0.0051  1.63  0.102  0.0113  3.78  0.000  −0.0002  −0.04  0.972
LARGE 0.0056  1.02  0.308  0.0062  0.62  0.538  −0.0075  −0.97  0.334
VOL LARGE  −0.0078  −0.92  0.360  −0.0270  −1.58  0.115  0.0047  0.40  0.690
BIG −0.0157  −1.67  0.094  −0.0058  −0.34  0.730  0.0209  1.50  0.134
VOL BIG  −0.0189  −1.57  0.117  0.0002  0.01  0.995  0.0488  2.81  0.005
SIZE −0.0119  −2.70  0.007  −0.0094  −1.07  0.285  0.0305  4.72  0.000
LEV 0.1290  20.56  0.000  0.2997  20.60  0.000  −0.0807  −9.49  0.000
GROWTH 0.0000  −0.03  0.973  −0.0001  −0.19  0.851  0.0000  0.43  0.665
ROA −0.0455  −3.23  0.001  0.2597  8.96  0.000  0.2057  9.82  0.000
LIQ 0.0009  2.06  0.040  0.0032  3.90  0.000  0.0031  3.83  0.000
N EARN  0.0018  0.79  0.428  0.0075  1.66  0.096  0.0025  0.77  0.442
AGE −0.0038  −7.27  0.000  −0.0040  −4.30  0.000  0.0028  3.51  0.000
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept  0.2103  5.07  0.000  0.0877  1.15  0.250  −0.3829  −6.12  0.000
N 24,053  11,151  12,902
R2 4.06%  10.81%  6.48%
F 43.36  39.14  28.26
Panel A reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1AUDITit + ˇ2VOLit + ˇ3LARGEit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit + ˇ5BIGit +
ˇ6VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
Panel B reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1VOLit + ˇ2LARGEit + ˇ3BIGit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit +
ˇ5VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
EM is proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|) and the signed accruals (+/−DA).
Coefﬁcients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
b
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teen  audited  at  least  once  for  the  period  2008--2013.  We
xclude  the  never-audited  companies  because  we  think  that
hey  may  be  quite  different  from  those  which  have  been
udited.  However,  results  may  be  affected  by  this  exclu-
ion.  Therefore,  to  test  if  this  selection  procedure  affects
t
s
p
uhe  results  we  expand  the  sample  with  the  observations  of
he  companies  that  have  never  been  audited  for  the  period
ample.  We  only  re-run  Model  [1]  for  the  expanded  sam-
le,  because  the  sub-sample  of  audited  companies  remains
nchanged.
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Table  5  Additional  analysis  with  expanded  sample.
Panel  A:  Descriptive  statistics
Non  audited  below  SAT  Audited  below  SAT  Test  for  mean  differences
Variable  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  diff  t  p-Value
+/−DA  73,785  −0.0023  0.1485  4278  −0.0111  0.1402  0.0088  3.77  0.000
|DA| 73,785 0.0947 0.1143  4278  0.0901  0.1080  0.0046  2.56  0.005
TA 73,785 −0.0332 0.1536 4278  −0.0479  0.1491  0.0147  6.10  0.000
SIZE 73,785  7.3843 0.8227 4278  8.5446 0.9172 −1.1603  −89.09  0.000
LEV 73,785  0.6099  0.2367  4278  0.5426  0.2537  0.0673  17.99  0.000
GROWTH 73,785  −0.0180  0.3019  4278  0.0261  0.3329  −0.0441  −9.22  0.000
ROA 73,785  0.0076  0.0664  4278  0.0052  0.0745  0.0024  2.30  0.011
LIQ 73,785  1.9055  1.6197  4278  2.0788  2.1163  −0.1733  −6.68  0.000
AGE 73,785  20.1396  8.0048  4278  22.4353  11.9685  −2.2957  −17.65  0.000
Non audited  above  SAT  Audited  above  SAT  Test  for  mean  differences
Variable  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  Obs.  Mean  S.  dev.  diff  t  p-Value
+/−DA 1250  −0.0053 0.1372 19,775  −0.0070  0.1318  0.0017  0.44  0.328
|DA| 1250  0.0927  0.1012  19,775  0.0896  0.0970  0.0031  1.09  0.138
TA 1250  −0.0324  0.1405  19,775  −0.0332  0.1351  0.0008  0.20  0.420
SIZE 1250  8.5820  0.5859  19,775  8.7731  0.6397  −0.1911  −10.29  0.000
LEV 1250  0.6095  0.2241  19,775  0.5794  0.2305  0.0301  4.49  0.000
GROWTH 1250  −0.0814  0.2480  19,775  −0.0655  0.2171  −0.0159  −2.49  0.006
ROA 1250  0.0185  0.0668  19,775  0.0180  0.0637  0.0005  0.29  0.385
LIQ 1250  1.7767  1.4823  19,775  1.9114  1.6689  −0.1346  −2.78  0.003
AGE 1250  20.5920  9.5827  19,775  22.4514  10.9274  −1.8594  −5.87  0.000
Panel B:  Regression  results  Model  1
|DA| +DA  −DA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t| Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
AUDIT  −0.0085  −4.13  0.000  −0.0196  −5.63  0.000  −0.0019  −0.69  0.490
VOL 0.0062  2.13  0.033  0.0174  3.46  0.001  0.0004  0.09  0.925
LARGE 0.0043  0.95  0.342  −0.0003  −0.03  0.973  −0.0119  −2.01  0.045
VOL LARGE  0.0040  0.56  0.579  0.0034  0.26  0.795  0.0022  0.24  0.813
BIG −0.0073  −0.98  0.327  0.0159  1.18  0.236  0.0090  0.91  0.364
VOL BIG −0.0077  −0.74  0.459  −0.0176  −0.93  0.353  0.0172  1.26  0.209
SIZE 0.0116  4.59  0.000  0.0610  12.63  0.000  0.0213  5.92  0.000
LEV 0.1197  28.38  0.000  0.1307  13.68  0.000  −0.1198  −21.11  0.000
GROWTH 0.0000  2.00  0.046  0.0001  1.66  0.097  0.0000  −1.22  0.224
ROA 0.0560  7.63  0.000  0.1351  9.78  0.000  0.2199  19.11  0.000
LIQ 0.0002  1.59  0.112  0.0041  8.30  0.000  0.0024  6.02  0.000
N EARN 0.0105 8.19  0.000  0.0003  0.12  0.902  0.0033  1.81  0.071
AGE −0.0033  −7.03  0.000  −0.0064  −8.25  0.000  0.0030  4.58  0.000
Year dum  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept 0.0045  0.20  0.839  −0.3209  −8.22  0.000  −0.2530  −7.71  0.000
N 99,088  47,921  51,167
%  
 
tR2 1.82%  3.96
F 67.22  46.84
Table  5  reports  the  descriptive  statistics  and  regression
results  for  this  sample.  We  can  see  that  the  total  sample  is
increased  up  to  99,088  observations,  78,063  of  them  belong-
ing  to  the  sub-sample  below  SAT.5 We  can  see  that  results  for
5 We could only collect data from this sub-sample for the period
2008--2011.
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he  test  variables  are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  reported
n  Table  4  Panel  A.
On  the  other  hand,  our  selection  process  also  excludes
he  companies  that  have  been  above  the  upper  EU  thresh-
lds  in  some  years  of  the  sample  period.  Since  this  exclusion
ould  be  producing  a  survivorship  bias,  we  do  an  additional
est  by  including  the  companies  below  those  thresholds  in
ny  of  the  years  of  the  period,  increasing  our  sample  in  4667
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Table  6  Inclusion  of  companies  above  EU  SAT.
Panel  A:  Model  1
|DA| +DA  −DA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
AUDIT  −0.0077  −3.81  0.000  −0.0134  −3.78  0.000  −0.0013  −0.46  0.648
VOL 0.0074 2.57 0.010  0.0145  2.78  0.005  0.0008  0.20  0.839
LARGE 0.0001 0.03 0.979 −0.0074  −1.01  0.311  −0.0080  −1.47  0.141
VOL LARGE 0.0041 0.58 0.565 0.0079 0.60 0.550 0.0021  0.22  0.826
BIG −0.0049  −0.76  0.450  0.0206  1.70  0.090  0.0038  0.44  0.660
VOL BIG  −0.0142  −1.43  0.153  −0.0450  −2.42  0.015  0.0234  1.77  0.078
SIZE −0.0013  −0.44  0.661  0.0179  3.32  0.001  0.0191  4.69  0.000
LEV 0.1255  25.38  0.000  0.2208  19.65  0.000  −0.0792  −13.07  0.000
GROWTH 0.0000  0.84  0.399  −0.0001  −0.13  0.893  0.0000  −0.85  0.396
ROA 0.0042  0.42  0.672  0.1287  7.56  0.000  0.1739  11.75  0.000
LIQ 0.0003  1.04  0.297  0.0031  5.36  0.000  0.0023  4.85  0.000
N EARN  0.0061  3.32  0.001  0.0042  1.20  0.230  −0.0009  −0.36  0.717
AGE −0.0041  −9.57  0.000  −0.0065  −8.68  0.000  0.0028  4.49  0.000
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept 0.1313  4.64  0.000  −0.0382  −0.78  0.433  −0.2794  −6.88  0.000
N 37,262  17,407  19,855
R2 3.22%  6.52%  5.40%
F 56.75  41.12  41.16
Panel  B:  Model  2
|DA| +DA  −DA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
VOL  0.0108  2.84  0.005  0.0207  2.85  0.004  −0.0003  −0.05  0.958
LARGE −0.0014  −0.26  0.792  −0.0063  −0.65  0.514  −0.0015  −0.22  0.822
VOL LARGE  −0.0095  −1.06  0.291  −0.0300  −1.66  0.096  0.0072  0.60  0.548
BIG −0.0025  −0.30  0.766  0.0031  0.20  0.841  0.0074  0.64  0.522
VOL BIG  −0.0187  −1.52  0.128  −0.0418  −1.75  0.081  0.0377  2.24  0.025
SIZE −0.0037  −1.00  0.318  0.0026  0.37  0.709  0.0198  3.89  0.000
LEV 0.1319  23.86  0.000  0.2881  21.63  0.000  −0.0751  −11.32  0.000
GROWTH 0.0000  0.01  0.995  0.0005  0.99  0.321  0.0000  0.37  0.709
ROA −0.0173  −1.34  0.181  0.1592  6.35  0.000  0.1918  10.39  0.000
LIQ 0.0004  0.99  0.320  0.0036  4.80  0.000  0.0045  6.33  0.000
N EARN  0.0052  2.35  0.019  0.0058  1.33  0.183  0.0005  0.16  0.871
AGE −0.0041  −8.41  0.000  −0.0058  −6.70  0.000  0.0023  3.39  0.001
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept 0.1432  4.01  0.000  0.0343  0.54  0.590  −0.2877  −5.64  0.000
N 28,483  13,239  15,244
R2 3.97%  9.73%  6.10%
F 53.13  45.31  34.35
Panel A reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1AUDITit + ˇ2VOLit + ˇ3LARGEit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit + ˇ5BIGit +
ˇ6VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
Panel B reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1VOLit + ˇ2LARGEit + ˇ3BIGit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit +
ˇ5VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
EM is proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DA|). and the signed accruals (+/−DA).
Coefﬁcients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
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mbservations.  Results  are  reported  in  Table  6  and  are  qual-
tatively  similar  to  those  reported  in  ‘‘Empirical  results’’.
he  only  remarkable  difference  is  that  VOL  BIG  is  signif-
cantly  negative  (positive)  when  using  positive  (negative)
ccruals,  suggesting  that  Big  4  auditors  restrain  earnings
w
s
m
sanagement.  However,  since  results  in  Tables  4  and  5,  as
ell  as  results  for  absolute  accruals  in  Table  6,  do  not
upport  them,  we  cannot  state  that  Big  4  auditors  are
ore  restrictive  than  the  rest  of  auditors  in  the  voluntary
etting.
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Table  7  Alternative  measures  of  EM.
Panel  A:  Model  1
ABWCA  ABACC  TA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
AUDIT  −0.0266  −4.47  0.000  −0.0262  −4.33  0.000  −0.0172  −5.69  0.000
VOL 0.0263 3.35 0.001  0.0209  2.62  0.009  0.0140  3.34  0.001
LARGE 0.0011 0.09 0.929 0.0043  0.34  0.737  −0.0118  −1.84  0.065
VOL LARGE −0.0112 −0.58 0.562 −0.0065 −0.33 0.743 −0.0013  −0.12  0.901
BIG 0.0326  1.59  0.113  0.0400  1.89  0.059  0.0293  2.75  0.006
VOL BIG  −0.0402  −1.43  0.153  −0.0621  −2.14  0.032  −0.0040  −0.27  0.789
SIZE 0.0454  4.38  0.000  0.0521  4.89  0.000  0.0794  15.57  0.000
LEV 0.0070  0.41  0.679  −0.0873  −5.02  0.000  −0.0071  −0.86  0.392
GROWTH −0.0101  −16.94  0.000  −0.0101  −16.76  0.000  0.0000  −0.93  0.354
ROA 0.4051  11.93  0.000  0.4489  12.91  0.000  0.4380  27.70  0.000
LIQ 0.0020  2.37  0.018  0.0018  2.07  0.039  0.0049  10.75  0.000
N EARN  −0.0112  −2.09  0.037  −0.0042  −0.77  0.440  −0.0057  −2.03  0.042
AGE 0.0161  11.73  0.000  0.0176  12.60  0.000  −0.0075  −10.61  0.000
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept −0.7836  −8.13  0.000  −0.8981  −9.08  0.000  −0.5429  −11.36  0.000
N 26,942  26,669  32,595
R2 4.52%  5.02%  7.84%
F 56.75  62.64  122.72
Panel  B:  Model  2
ABWCA  ABACC  TA
Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|  Coef.  t  P  >  |t|
VOL  0.0168  1.61  0.108  0.0138  1.60  0.111  0.0111  2.01  0.044
LARGE 0.0204  1.27  0.205  0.0213  1.30  0.195  −0.0116  −1.41  0.160
VOL LARGE  0.0120  0.50  0.618  0.0137  0.55  0.580  0.0045  0.35  0.725
BIG 0.0007  0.03  0.979  0.0131  0.47  0.641  0.0353  2.49  0.013
VOL BIG  −0.0444  −1.30  0.195  −0.0631  −1.77  0.076  0.0064  0.35  0.724
SIZE 0.0746  5.53  0.000  0.0783  5.62  0.000  0.0914  13.65  0.000
LEV −0.0164  −0.83  0.405  −0.1437  −7.14  0.000  −0.0037  −0.39  0.696
GROWTH 0.0233  2.66  0.008  0.0080  0.89  0.375  0.0000  −0.13  0.896
ROA 0.3709  8.67  0.000  0.4029  9.13  0.000  0.3161  14.82  0.000
LIQ 0.0036  2.84  0.005  0.0028  2.15  0.031  0.0070  10.24  0.000
N EARN  −0.0083  −1.28  0.199  −0.0019  −0.28  0.781  −0.0125  −3.64  0.000
AGE 0.0155  9.72  0.000  0.0165  10.07  0.000  −0.0084  −10.58  0.000
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes
Intercept −1.0451  −8.23  0.000  −1.1034  −8.44  0.000  −0.6477  −10.34  0.000
N 19,953  19,777  24,053
R2 3.70%  4.26%  6.71%
F 32.53  37.26  73.62
Panel A reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1AUDITit + ˇ2VOLit + ˇ3LARGEit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit + ˇ5BIGit +
ˇ6VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
Panel B reports the ﬁrm FE regressions of the following model: EMit =  ˛ + ˇ1VOLit + ˇ2LARGEit + ˇ3BIGit + ˇ4VOL LARGEit +
ˇ5VOL BIGit + CONTROL + εit.
EM is proxied by the signed abnormal working capital accruals (ABWCA, DeFond and Park, 2001), the signed abnormal accruals (ABACC,
Francis and Wang, 2008) and the total accruals (TA).
eCoefﬁcients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
Alternative  deﬁnition  of  Middle-Tier  auditors  and
inclusion  of  audit  opinion
Our  deﬁnition  of  Middle-Tier  auditor  is  wider  than  that  one
used  in  previous  papers  (Boone  et  al.,  2010;  Swanquist
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Ut  al.,  2012;  Sundgren  and  Svanström,  2013),  and  it  can
e  considered  a  bit  arbitrary.  For  this  reason,  we  consider
 more  restrictive  deﬁnition  of  this  variable,  by  consider-
ng  only  BDO  and  Grant-Thornton  as  Middle-Tier  auditors.
nreported  results  do  not  show  a  signiﬁcant  association
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etween  large  auditors  and  earnings  management,  so  results
n  this  section  support  those  ones  reported  in  the  main
nalysis.
On  the  other  hand,  the  lack  of  a  signiﬁcant  relation-
hip  between  large  auditors  and  earnings  management  may
nvolve  that  these  auditors  issue  more  modiﬁed  audit  reports
han  the  rest  of  auditors.  For  this  reason,  we  include  a
ummy  variable,  MOD, which  equals  0  when  the  audit  ﬁrms
ssue  a  clean  opinion  and  1  otherwise.  Unreported  results
how  that  this  variable  is  not  signiﬁcant  in  any  regression,
nd  results  for  AUDIT, BIG  and  LARGE  are  similar  to  those
eported  in  the  main  analysis.
lternative  measures  of  earnings  management
o  test  if  the  results  are  sensitive  to  the  measure  of  earn-
ngs  management  we  used,  we  also  estimate  discretionary
ccruals  using  a  variation  of  the  original  Jones  Model,  modi-
ed  by  Dechow  et  al.  (1995).  Unreported  results  are  similar
o  those  reported  in  Section  ‘‘Empirical  results’’  and  sup-
ort  the  conclusions  of  the  main  analysis.  Moreover,  we  also
se  the  total  accruals  (TA)  as  our  measure  of  earnings  man-
gement,  as  well  as  two  measures  no  based  in  the  Jones
odel,  in  particular  the  measures  used  by  DeFond  and  Park
2001)  and  Francis  and  Wang  (2008),  who  use  a  linear  expec-
ation  model  in  which  predicted  accruals  are  based  on  a
rm’s  prior  year  ratio  of  current  accruals  to  sales  (ABWCA,
eFond  and  Park,  2002),  and  the  prior  year’s  ratio  of  depre-
iation  to  property,  plant  and  equipment  (ABACC,  Francis
nd  Wang,  2008),  and  abnormal  accruals  are  calculated  as
he  difference  between  real  and  predicted  accruals:
BWCAt =  WCAt − WCAt−1
Salest−1
×  Salest
BACCt =  TAt −
(
WCAt−1
Salest−1
×  Salest
+ Depreciationt−1
PPEt−1
×  PPEt
)
The  main  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it  implic-
tly  controls  for  differences  among  companies  in  the  same
ndustry,  because  it  uses  a  ﬁrm  as  its  own  control  to  compute
bnormal  accruals.  Abnormal  accruals  are  scaled  by  a  ﬁrm’s
agged  total  assets.  On  the  other  hand,  since  data  for  two
onsecutive  years  are  needed  to  calculate  abnormal  accru-
ls,  our  sample  for  these  measures  runs  from  2009  to  2013.
esults  for  TA,  ABWCA  and  ABACC  are  reported  in  Table  7.
e  can  see  that  results  for  AUDIT  and  VOL  are  consistent
ith  those  reported  in  the  previous  analysis.
onclusionst  is  widely  accepted  that  auditing  helps  to  improve  the  qual-
ty  of  the  ﬁnancial  information  and  some  papers  provide
vidence  of  audited  ﬁnancial  statements  being  perceived
c
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f  higher  quality  and  thus,  related  with  a  lower  cost  of
ebt.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  audited  ﬁnancial
nformation  is  actually  of  higher  quality.  In  this  sense,  pre-
ious  literature  about  auditing  and  earnings  management
as  focused  on  audit  quality,  proxied  by  auditor  size  or
uditor  tenure,  but  there  is  a  lack  of  empirical  research
bout  the  ‘‘audit  vs.  no  audit’’ discussion.  Moreover,  there
s  no  research  about  the  differences  between  voluntary  and
andatory  audits  on  accounting  quality.  This  paper  provides
mpirical  evidence  about  both  questions  among  Spanish
MEs.
We  ﬁnd  evidence  that  auditing  helps  to  limit  earnings
anagement,  proxied  by  the  absolute  value  of  discretionary
ccruals;  voluntary  audits  also  deter  earnings  management,
ut  in  a  lesser  extent  than  the  mandatory  ones.  These
esults  suggest  that  auditors  seem  more  permissive  when
erforming  voluntary  audits,  what  may  be  explained  by
he  lower  visibility  and  litigation  risks  faced  by  them  in
he  voluntary  setting.  When  we  examine  separately  pos-
tive  and  negative  discretionary  accruals,  we  ﬁnd  that
udits  help  to  mitigate  income-increasing  behaviours,  but
hey  are  not  effective  when  companies  manage  downward.
hese  results  can  be  explained  by  the  auditor  conser-
atism,  for  which  auditors  are  not  effective  against  earnings
anagement  when  companies  have  incentives  to  manage
ownward.
On  the  other  hand,  we  do  not  ﬁnd  signiﬁcant  differences
or  SMEs  audited  by  large  auditors,  thus  it  suggests  that  high
uality  auditors  do  not  have  incentives  to  be  more  restric-
ive  than  the  rest  of  auditors  in  a  setting  with  low  litigation
isk.  Results  are  robust  to  the  use  of  four  different  measures
f  earnings  management,  alternative  samples,  a  different
eﬁnition  for  Middle-Tier  auditors,  and  the  inclusion  of  the
udit  report  as  a  control  variable.
The  paper  has  several  limitations.  First,  results  may  be
ffected  by  endogeneity  problems.  Although  we  tackle  them
sing  ﬁxed-effects  regressions,  we  cannot  rule  out  com-
letely  that  they  have  been  solved.  Another  limitation  is
he  measure  of  earnings  management.  The  estimation  of  our
roxy  for  discretionary  accruals  involves  errors  of  measure
nd  requires  the  previous  calculation  of  real  accruals  and
stimated  accruals.  We  have  used  alternative  measures  for
arnings  management,  and  they  show  similar  results.  Finally,
s  we  cannot  ensure  that  companies  below  SAT  are  volun-
arily  audited,  conclusions  about  voluntary  audits  must  be
nterpreted  with  caution.
There  are  several  streams  of  future  research  related  with
his  paper.  First  at  all,  although  we  do  not  ﬁnd  evidence  that
udit  quality  does  not  affect  earnings  management  in  the
etting  of  SMEs,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  if  high  quality
uditors  have  an  additional  value,  such  as  an  improvement  of
he  credibility  of  the  ﬁnancial  statements,  regardless  their
ctual  quality  or  the  value  of  audit  quality  in  speciﬁc  sett-
ngs  with  different  litigation  risk,  such  as  SMEs  involved  in
reditors’  meetings  or  tax  inspections.  Secondly,  the  results
bout  large  auditors  suggest  that  audit  quality  in  the  SMEs
etting  should  be  examined  using  other  proxies  for  it,  such
s  auditor  tenure  or  audit  fees,  rather  than  auditor  size.
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Appendix.
See  Table  A1.
Table  A1  Description  of  variables.
Variable  name  Description
Dependent  variable
EM  Earnings  management  measure
|DA| Absolute  discretionary  accruals
+/− DA Signed  discretionary  accruals
ABWCA  Abnormal  working  capital
accruals  (DeFond  and  Park,  2001)
ABACC  Abnormal  accruals  (Francis  and
Wang,  2008)
TA Total  accruals
Test  variables
AUDIT  Dummy  that  equals  1  if  company
is audited,  0  otherwise
VOL Dummy  that  equals  1  if  company
is voluntarily  audited,  0
otherwise
BIG Dummy  that  equals  1  if  company
is audited  by  a  Big  4  auditor,  0
otherwise
LARGE
VOL LARGE
Dummy  that  equals  1  if  company
is audited  by  either  a
Middle-Tier  auditor  or  a  Big  4
auditor,  0  otherwise
Interaction  term  of  VOL  and
LARGE
VOL BIG  Interaction  term  of  VOL  and  BIG
Control  variables
SIZE  Company  size,  measured  as  the
natural  logarithm  of  total  assets
LEV Leverage,  measured  as  the  ratio
of interest  bearing  debt  to  total
assets
GROWTH  Growth  of  the  company,
measured  as  the  growth  of  sales
ROA Proﬁtability,  measured  as  the
ratio  of  earnings  before  interest
and taxes  to  total  assets
LIQ Level  of  liquidity,  measured  as
the ratio  of  current  assets  to
current  liabilities
NEG EARN  Dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if
company  has  negative  earnings
and  0  otherwise
AGE  Age  of  the  company
DUMyear  Year  dummies
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